Suppressing emotions impairs subsequent stroop performance and reduces prefrontal brain activation by Friese, Malte et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2013
Suppressing emotions impairs subsequent stroop performance and reduces
prefrontal brain activation
Friese, Malte; Binder, Julia; Luechinger, Roger; Boesiger, Peter; Rasch, Björn
Abstract: Abundant behavioral evidence suggests that the ability to self-control is limited, and that any
exertion of self-control will increase the likelihood of subsequent self-control failures. Here we investigated
the neural correlates underlying the aftereffects of self-control on future control processes using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). An initial act of self-control (suppressing emotions) impaired sub-
sequent performance in a second task requiring control (Stroop task). On the neural level, increased
activity during emotion suppression was followed by a relative decrease in activity during the Stroop
task in a cluster in the right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), an area engaged in the effortful implementation of control. There was no reliable evidence
for reduced activity in the medial frontal cortex (MFC) including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
which is involved in conflict detection processes and has previously also been implicated in self-control.
Follow-up analyses showed that the detected cluster in the right lateral PFC and an area in the MFC
were involved in both the emotion suppression task and the Stroop task, but only the cluster in the right
lateral PFC showed reduced activation after emotion suppression during the Stroop task. Reduced ac-
tivity in lateral prefrontal areas relevant for the implementation of control may be a critical consequence
of prior self-control exertion if the respective areas are involved in both self-control tasks.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060385
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-77769
Published Version
Originally published at:
Friese, Malte; Binder, Julia; Luechinger, Roger; Boesiger, Peter; Rasch, Björn (2013). Suppressing
emotions impairs subsequent stroop performance and reduces prefrontal brain activation. PLoS ONE,
8(4):e60385. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060385
Suppressing Emotions Impairs Subsequent Stroop
Performance and Reduces Prefrontal Brain Activation
Malte Friese1*., Julia Binder2., Roger Luechinger3, Peter Boesiger3, Bjo¨rn Rasch2*
1Department of Psychology, Saarland University, Saarbruecken, Germany, 2Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, 3 Institute for Biomedical
Engineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract
Abundant behavioral evidence suggests that the ability to self-control is limited, and that any exertion of self-control will
increase the likelihood of subsequent self-control failures. Here we investigated the neural correlates underlying the
aftereffects of self-control on future control processes using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). An initial act of
self-control (suppressing emotions) impaired subsequent performance in a second task requiring control (Stroop task). On
the neural level, increased activity during emotion suppression was followed by a relative decrease in activity during the
Stroop task in a cluster in the right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an
area engaged in the effortful implementation of control. There was no reliable evidence for reduced activity in the medial
frontal cortex (MFC) including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is involved in conflict detection processes and has
previously also been implicated in self-control. Follow-up analyses showed that the detected cluster in the right lateral PFC
and an area in the MFC were involved in both the emotion suppression task and the Stroop task, but only the cluster in the
right lateral PFC showed reduced activation after emotion suppression during the Stroop task. Reduced activity in lateral
prefrontal areas relevant for the implementation of control may be a critical consequence of prior self-control exertion if the
respective areas are involved in both self-control tasks.
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Introduction
The ability to control one’s impulses, emotions, thoughts and
action tendencies is crucial for living in line with personal
standards and social norms. Failures in self-control contribute to
many social problems such as obesity, drug use, smoking,
alcoholism, or crime [1,2]. It is therefore of great interest to
understand the processes underlying self-control failures.
Self-control can be defined as the ability to interrupt and
override dominant response tendencies and replace them with
different responses that are in line with current goals, personal
standards, and social norms [3]. Behavioral evidence suggests that
the ability to repeatedly exert self-control over time may be limited
[4,5]. Similar results have been obtained for the recruitment of
executive functions [6] that subserve the various control processes
involved in self-control [7]. Akin to a muscle that is tired after
demands and fails to reach its highest level of performance, self-
control performance is impaired by preceding efforts at self-
control, even if these efforts have occurred in a different behavioral
domain. Thus, exerting self-control may lead to a state of
exhaustion, depletion or reduced motivation to control, which
augments the likelihood of subsequent self-control failures. For
example, after initial acts of self-control such as the control of
attention, thoughts, or emotions, individuals showed decrements in
control in that they reacted more aggressively to a provocation, ate
more of a tempting snack, engaged in riskier behavior, and
performed more poorly on executive function tasks [6,8–10].
Importantly, an initial exertion of self-control does not impair
performance on any subsequent task, but particularly on those
tasks requiring effort and control [11].
Despite abundant behavioral evidence for impairing aftereffects
of initial exertions of self-control [12], little is known about the
neural mechanisms underlying these aftereffects. Prior research
has investigated the neural correlates of self-control performance
in single self-control tasks, but few studies have examined brain
activity in two consecutive tasks and – in particular – the
aftereffects of brain activity during the first task on brain activity
during the second self-control task. The present study aimed at
filling this gap. Evidence for the neural correlates of the aftereffects
of self-control exertion would be valuable as it could shed light on
the processes associated with a use-dependent weakening of
control processes and thereby contribute more generally to theory
building on self-control and its failures.
Self-control efforts have consistently been associated with
increased activity in lateral prefrontal as well as medial frontal
areas [7,13–15]. These brain regions have been associated with
different subprocesses of self-control performance. The detection
of conflicts and errors as well as the recruitment of cognitive
control is supported by a region in the medial frontal cortex (MFC,
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the conflict-and-error-detection zone, including the dorsal part of
the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) [16–18] and has been
considered an efficient and largely resource-independent process
[19]. In contrast, the implementation of control is considered
a resource-demanding process, which has been associated with
lateral prefrontal areas, in particular with the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) [19–21].
Relying on behavioral measures alone, it is difficult to
disentangle which of these processes are impaired after initial
self-control efforts: conflict detection, the implementation of
cognitive control, both, or none of these. In behavioral studies,
aftereffects of self-control primarily affected effortful, resource-
demanding processes [11,22]. Applied to the neural level, these
findings suggest decreased activity after self-control exertion than
after a task not requiring self-control in brain areas that are
typically engaged in the effortful implementation of control (e.g.,
the DLPFC), but less so in brain areas engaged in presumably
effortless processes such as conflict detection (e.g., the conflict-and-
error-detection zone in the MFC) [16].
Despite its popularity in behavioral (social) psychological
research [12], very few studies have directly investigated the
neural underpinnings of aftereffects of self-control. In a study using
electroencephalography (EEG), Inzlicht and colleagues [23]
reported that controlling one’s emotions reduced the error-related
negativity as a marker of ACC activity in a subsequent Stroop task
as compared to control participants. This result indicated an
impairment of the conflict-and-error-detection process and
suggested that the conflict-and-error-detection process may not
be as resource-independent as hypothesized on theoretical grounds
[19]. Aftereffects of self-control on lateral prefrontal areas involved
in the implementation of control were not examined in this study.
In addition, because no brain activity was recorded during the first
self-control task, it remains unknown whether or not the reduced
ACC activity during the Stroop task was preceded by increased
demands on the ACC during the preceding emotion suppression
task.
In another study using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), Richeson et al. [24] observed stronger activity in the right
DLPFC in white volunteers while viewing black versus white male
faces, indicating stronger engagement of control processes for
black as compared to white faces. Individual differences in right
DLPFC activity during this task were taken as an indicator of self-
regulatory demands participants would face during an interaction
with a black individual. In a separate session, the degree of implicit
racial bias [25] predicted the impairment of cognitive control as
indicated by poorer performance in a Stroop task after a short
interracial interaction. Remarkably, the degree of activity in the
right DLPFC during the face-viewing task mediated this effect of
implicit racial bias on Stroop task performance. While this study
provides indirect support for the assumption of aftereffects of
DLPFC activity on subsequent self-control performance, a direct
comparison of brain activity during the face-viewing task (or the
interracial interaction) and the Stroop task was not conducted.
In the current study, we used fMRI to measure brain activity
during both an initial (emotion suppression) and a subsequent self-
control task (Stroop task, see Figure 1). Both suppressing emotions
and inhibiting dominant responses during a Stroop task require
increased activity in brain areas important for self-control [14,26].
Applying the muscle metaphor to the level of brain activity we
hypothesized that if a brain area involved in self-control is
commonly activated in both the first (emotion suppression) and the
second (Stroop) self-control task, then activity in this brain area
would be reduced in the second task if both tasks are completed
consecutively. This effect should be evident for brain areas
involved in the resource-demanding, effortful implementation of
control, such as the DLPFC [4,19]. Hypotheses involving conflict
detection in the medial frontal cortex including the ACC were less
clear. Theoretical models expect conflict detection to be an
efficient and resource-independent process [19], but previous
research [23] suggests that it may in fact be sensitive to aftereffects
of increased activity. To test these hypotheses, the right and left
lateral PFC as well as the MFC served as regions of interest (ROI)
and were functionally defined in an independent sample (see fMRI
methods).
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Canton
of Zurich, Switzerland. Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Participants and Design
Forty-two females naı¨ve to the Stroop task participated in the
study. We included only females because of the known gender-
effects in emotional processing and related brain activity [27] such
as differences in amygdala function during emotional experiences,
memory for emotional events and different responsiveness to
emotional material. We excluded one participant due to move-
ments greater than 3 mm during the fMRI measurement, one
because she did not follow instructions during the initial self-
control task, and one due to self-reported claustrophobia in-
terfering with adequate data acquisition in the narrow fMRI
scanner. In the final sample, there were 20 participants in the
suppression group and 19 participants in the control group. Mean
age of the final sample was 23.54 years (SD= 2.84). Participants
were randomly assigned to an emotion suppression group or
a control group. In addition, we recruited an additional group of
19 volunteers (Mage = 23.25, SD= 3.54) to define our prefrontal
regions of interest (see fMRI methods). All participants received
CHF 25/hour (approximately US $23).
Procedure
First, participants briefly practiced both the picture-viewing task
and the Stroop task outside the fMRI scanner to become familiar
with them. After practicing, participants were positioned in the
fMRI scanner. Their head was fixated in the coil using small
cushions, and they were told not to move their head. Next, they
performed both tasks while functional MR-images were acquired
followed by an anatomical scan. Outside the fMRI scanner,
participants filled in a questionnaire including several control
questions, the manipulation check, demographic data, and were
debriefed (see Figure 1a).
Materials and Measures
Picture-viewing task. Twenty-four neutral and 24 negative
pictures were taken from the International Affective Picture
System (1 = most negative/least arousing, 9 = most positive/most
arousing) [28]. The sets differed significantly in valence
(Mneg = 1.97, SDneg= 0.33, Mneu = 5.07, SDneu = 0.23, F(1,
46) = 1409.25, p,.001). In addition, negative pictures were
significantly more arousing than neutral pictures (Mneg = 5.85,
SDneg = 0.76, Mneu = 3.08, SDneu = 0.62, F(1, 46) = 190.99,
p,.001). Pictures of the same valence were randomized within
blocks of 4 pictures (6 neutral blocks, 6 negative blocks, 48 pictures
in total). The order of the blocks was also randomized, except that
two blocks of negatively valenced pictures always occurred at the
end of the task. Prior to every picture block, a fixation-cross
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appeared on the screen for 500 ms followed by the instruction
presented for 1.5 seconds (‘‘suppress’’ [unterdru¨cken] or ‘‘watch’’
[anschauen] depending on condition). Each picture was presented
for 7 seconds. The interblock-interval was 5 seconds. Similar to
previous research [12,29], participants in the suppression group
were instructed to suppress all emotions elicited by the pictures
and to control their facial reactions. In the control group,
participants were told that it was okay to allow emotions in
response to the pictures.
Stroop task. In each trial, a stimulus appeared in blue, red,
or yellow ink and participants were instructed to react to the ink
color and ignore the semantic meaning of the stimulus by pressing
one of three keys. In (in)congruent trials, the semantic meaning of
the word did (not) match the ink color. In neutral trials, ‘XXX’
appeared in one of the 3 colors. There were 120 congruent, 30
neutral, and 30 incongruent trials that were presented in a fixed
pseudo-random order. Stimuli remained on the screen until the
participant gave a response or until 1500 ms had passed followed
by a fixation cross. Each trial was 2200 ms long. There were 6
congruent trials immediately prior to and 6 congruent trials
immediately after the 180 critical trials. These 12 additional trials
were discarded. Errors on incongruent versus congruent trials as
well as incongruent versus neutral trials were analyzed as a function
of experimental condition (suppression vs. control).
Arousal ratings. In the picture-viewing task, participants
indicated their subjective arousal (large, medium, small) on a three-
point scale by pressing a button on a button box with their
dominant hand after each block. One participant failed to provide
arousal ratings.
Manipulation check. Participants answered two questions
indicative for exerted self-control on 7-point rating scales: ‘How
exhausting was it for you to follow the instructions during the
picture-viewing task?’ and ‘How much did you have to concen-
trate to follow the instructions during the picture-viewing task?’
(a= .94). The manipulation check was added later in the
experiment. The respective data are therefore only available for
the last 29 participants.
fMRI Methods and Procedures
Measurements were performed on a Philips Achieva 1.5 T
wholebody MR unit equipped with an eight-channel Philips
SENSE head coil. Functional time series were acquired with
a sensitivity encoded, single-shot echo-planar sequence (SENSE-
sshEPI) sensitive to BOLD contrast (T2* fast field echo with the
following acquisition parameters: TR (repetition time) = 3000 ms,
TE (echo time) = 45 ms, FOV (field of view) = 22 cm, acquisition
matrix = 80680, interpolated to 1286128, voxel size:
2.7562.7564 mm3, 32 contiguous axial slices without gaps and
SENSE acceleration factor R = 2.0). By using a midsagittal scout
image, 32 contiguous axial slices were placed tilted by 20u to the
anterior–posterior commissure plane covering the entire brain.
The first two acquisitions were discarded to allow for T1
saturation. The picture-viewing task as well as the Stroop task
consisted of 155 functional scans each. The tasks were measured in
two runs, separated by a short 1-min break. A projector displayed
stimuli on a screen in the scanner room, which subjects viewed
through a mirror mounted on top of the head coil. For each
subject, we also acquired high-resolution (0.866162 mm, 55
slices, TE = 15 ms, 3 averages) T1-weighted anatomical images.
Preprocessing was performed using SPM5 (Statistical Para-
metric Mapping; Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London, U.K.; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) implemented
in Matlab 2009a. Volumes were slice-time corrected to the first
slice, realigned to the first acquired volume, normalized to each
individual T1 image, and smoothed using a 8 mm full-width-at-
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A 128-sec-cutoff high-pass filter
was added to the confound partition of the design matrix to
account for low-frequency drifts, and a correction for intrinsic
autocorrelations was included in the analysis.
Figure 1. Overview of the experimental procedure and the behavioral results. (a) During the first task, the control group watched negative
and neutral pictures. The suppression group suppressed emotions while watching the same pictures. Both groups subsequently completed a Stroop
task. Brain imaging data was recorded during both tasks. (b) Participants in the emotion suppression group showed significantly stronger Stroop
interference effects than participants in the control group. (Errors on incongruent minus errors on congruent trials.) Error bars represent standard
errors of the mean (SE).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.g001
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Statistical Analyses of the fMRI Data
All statistical analyses of fMRI data were performed using
standard procedures provided by SPM5.
First level analysis. In the picture-viewing task, evoked
hemodynamic responses to different stimulus categories (negative
pictures, neutral pictures) were modeled for each subject with
a box-car function corresponding to stimulus presentations
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function
within the context of a general linear model (GLM). In addition,
the button presses during the arousal ratings were modeled as
events using a delta (stick) function. Six movement parameters
from spatial realigning were included as regressors of no interest.
In a separate GLM model for the Stroop task, event-related
regressors were used to model the display of congruent words,
incongruent words and neutral ‘‘XXX’’ trials using a delta (stick)
function corresponding to stimulus presentations convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function within the context of
a GLM. Only correct trials for congruent words, incongruent
words and ‘‘XXX’’ trials were used in the respective regressors. All
error trials were modeled in a separate regressor of no interest,
together with the first 6 and the last 6 congruent trials that were
excluded on the behavioral level. In addition, six movement
parameters from spatial realigning were included as regressors of
no interest.
Second level analysis. In the two experimental groups
(suppression vs. control), a random-effect group analysis was
conducted on contrast images of the picture-viewing task (negative
vs. neutral images) and the Stroop task (incongruent vs. congruent
trials) from the individual analysis, comparing parameter estimates
in the suppress group against the estimates in the control group.
We used a factorial model with the two factors ‘type of task’
(picture-viewing vs. Stroop, within-subjects factor) and ‘experi-
mental group’ (suppression vs. control, between-subjects factor) in
SPM5. We calculated the interaction between the type of task
(picture-viewing vs. Stroop) and the experimental group (suppres-
sion vs. control) using directional t-contrasts. The interaction was
further analyzed using planned pair-wise contrasts between the
two experimental groups in each task separately. In addition, we
extracted the parameter estimates for each subject at the peak
voxel to visualize the interaction.
ROI definition and significance threshold: To functionally
define regions of interest (ROIs) for the second-level analysis, we
recruited an independent sample of 19 participants who followed
the same procedure as the suppression and the control group with
the exception that they watched 12 blocks of only neutral pictures
before performing the identical Stroop task as participants in the
main study. To protect against false-positive activations, we used
a minimum cluster size as statistical threshold [30]. The non-
arbitrary voxel cluster size was determined using the software
AlphaSim [31]. On the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation (10000
iterations), clusters were considered significant at an overall whole
brain false-positive rate of 5% when exceeding k .28 voxels at an
individual voxel height threshold of p= .001. Based on the contrast
‘‘incongruent vs. congruent’’ trials in the Stroop task, we defined
three regions of interest: The right lateral PFC (k = 279 voxels,
peak activation at [47 17 32]; Z= 5.04), the left lateral PFC
(k = 607 voxels, peak activation at [241 33 20]; Z= 5.60; and the
MFC (k = 129 voxel, peak activation at [14 19 56]; Z= 4.92, see
Figure 2). The two lateral prefrontal regions included the following
anatomical regions (as defined by the AAL toolbox for SPM5 [32]:
38%/16% (right/left, respectively) of the region in the inferior
frontal gyrus (pars opercularis, BA 44), 24%/24% in the inferior
frontal gyrus (pars triangularis, BA 45), 17%/19% in the middle
frontal gyrus (BA 46, BA 9) and 16%/35% in the lateral precentral
gyrus (BA 6). The MFC region was located to 79% in the anterior
part of the supplementary motor area (pre-SMA; BA 6), 20% in
the superior frontal and medial frontal gyrus as well as the mid-
cingulate gyrus (BA 32). It thus encompassed large parts of the
conflict-and-error-detection zone [16]. For significance testing, we
combined the three regions to a single search mask (total number
of voxels: 1015 voxels, see Figure 2a–c).
Within this search volume, we used a significance threshold of
p,.05, corrected on the cluster level for multiple comparisons
using the software AlphaSim (minimum cluster size of k .7 voxels
at an individual voxel threshold of p= .001). For an exploratory
whole brain analysis, we used the same significance threshold as in
the ROI-definition group (minimum cluster size of k.28 voxels at
an individual voxel threshold of p= .001, see above).
Locations are indicated in coordinates of the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI). Anatomical labeling of clusters was
based on the AAL toolbox for SPM5 [32]. For identification of
Brodmann areas, we used the Talairch demon provided by
Lancaster and Fox (www.talairach.org) [33]. Transformation of
MNI to Talairach space was performed by a MATLAB tool
(icbm_spm2tal.m) [34,35] provided by the BrainMap Project at
the Research Imaging Institute of the University of Texas Health
Science Center San Antonio (brainmap.org).
Correlational Analyses
We extracted the parameter estimates for each subject for the
left and right lateral PFC as well as the medial prefrontal ROI in
the Stroop task to calculate correlations with Stroop performance
using SPSS. ROIs were defined by the independent ROI-
definition group. For each ROI, the first eigenvariate of all voxels
within the respective ROI was calculated. Parameter estimates
were extracted for each subject for the contrast ‘‘congruent vs.
incongruent trials’’.
Results
Manipulation Check
As expected, participants in the suppression group reported that
the picture viewing task was more exhausting for them and that
they had to concentrate harder (Msuppress = 3.63, SD= 1.99) than
participants in the control group (Mcontrol = 1.57, SD= 0.62;
t(27) = 3.72, p = .001, Cohen’s d= 1.40). Conversely, participants
in the suppression group subjectively rated the emotional pictures
as less arousing (Msuppress = 2.01, SD= 0.58) than participants in
the control group (Mcontrol = 2.89, SD= 0.14; t(36) = 6.53, p,.001,
Cohen’s d= 2.09).
Main Behavioral Results
Participants’ average response latency explained significant
variance in several analyses involving the Stroop task. We
therefore controlled for this variable in all analyses involving
error rates in the Stroop task (both behavioral and fMRI analyses).
All reported means are estimated marginal means controlling for
average response latency.
Consistent with prior findings, exertion of self-control in the
picture-viewing task (i.e. by suppressing one’s emotions) impaired
the subsequent performance in the Stroop task. Participants in the
suppression group had higher error rates in incongruent trials
(Msuppress = 11.15, SE= 1.35) as compared to participants in the
control group (Mcontrol = 5.57, SE= 1.38; F(1, 36) = 8.31, p = .007,
partial g2 = .187). No difference was observed for congruent trials
(Msuppress = 1.22, SE= 0.25, Mcontrol = 0.96, SE= 0.26; F(1,
36) = 0.54, p = .466, partial g2 = .015). The interaction between
the factors ‘group’ (suppression vs. control) and ‘trial type’
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(congruent vs. incongruent) was significant (mixed analysis of
covariance [ANCOVA], F(1, 36) = 7.99, p= .008, partial
g2 = .182; see Figure 1b). In addition, the analysis revealed the
classic Stroop interference effect of more errors on incongruent
than on congruent trials (F(1, 36) = 4.23, p= .047, partial
g2 = .105). The main effect of group was also significant (F(1,
36) = 8.08, p= .007, partial g2 = .183).
There was no effect of prior emotion suppression on error rates
in neutral trials in the Stroop task (Msuppress = 1.95, SE= 0.55,
Mcontrol = 2.71, SE= 0.57; F(1, 36) = 0.90, p = .349, partial
g2 = .024). When neutral trials were included in the analysis in
a 2 (group: suppression vs. control) 63 (trial type: congruent vs.
neutral vs. incongruent) mixed ANCOVA the group6 trial type
interaction remained significant (F(1.21, 43.71) = 7.61, p= .006,
partial g2 = .175, Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected) as well as when
analyzing only neutral and incongruent trials (F(1, 36) = 8.25,
p= .007, partial g2 = .186). When additionally controlling for
arousal ratings, the reported interactions between experimental
group and trial type remained significant (all ps ,.05) indicating
that differences in error rates between experimental conditions
were not due to differences in experienced arousal.
One could argue that error rates on incongruent trials were in
fact not increased for the suppression group, but for some reason
decreased for the control group as compared to normal
Figure 2. Regions of interest (ROI) used to identify effects of self-control exertion on prefrontal brain activity, superimposed on
a coronal (a) or sagittal slice (b–c) of an anatomical template image. The three ROIs were functionally defined by the brain activation during
the Stroop task (incongruent minus congruent trials; thresholded at p= .001, uncorrected, minimum cluster size k .28) in an independent sample of
19 healthy women who watched only neutral pictures before performing on the Stroop task. Blue: right lateral prefrontal cortex (lateral PFC); green:
left lateral PFC; red: medial frontal cortex (MFC). (d) Overlap of activation during suppression of emotions during picture-viewing (yellow) with regions
of interests obtained during the Stroop task (blue). Overlap is mainly observed in the right lateral prefrontal cortex and in the medial prefrontal cortex
(red). Regions of activation are displayed with a minimum cluster size of k .28 at an individual voxel threshold of p= .001 in both analyses,
superimposed on a coronal slice of an anatomical template image.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.g002
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circumstances. To rule out this possibility we compared the
experimental groups with the independently recruited ROI
definition group who had only seen neutral pictures before the
Stroop task. Error rates were comparable for congruent trials
across groups (Mcontrol = 0.92, SE= 0.24, MROI_def = 0.77,
SE= 0.24, Msuppression = 1.20, SE= 0.23), but the suppression
group had higher error rates on incongruent trials (Mcontrol = 5.97,
SE= 1.29, MROI_def = 7.17, SE= 1.31, Msuppression = 11.46,
SE= 1.27), resulting in a significant interaction between experi-
mental group and trial type (F(2, 54) = 4.52, p= .015, partial
g2 = .143). Thus, as expected, participants who had exerted self-
control in the picture-viewing task showed impaired performance
during the subsequent Stroop task during the difficult incongruent
trials, but not during easier congruent and neutral trials.
Response latencies showed the regular Stroop interference effect
between congruent and incongruent trials (F(1, 37) = 94.81,
p,.001, partial g2 = .719), but no interaction with the exper-
imental group (F(1, 37) ,1, p = .584, partial g2 = .008). Stroop
interference effects (incongruent-congruent) based on errors and
based on latencies were reliably correlated (r= .50, p= .001).
fMRI Data
According to the hypothesis, a brain area would be sensitive to
aftereffects of self-control if it was more engaged by participants
exerting self-control in the picture-viewing task (emotion suppres-
sion, contrast: negative vs. neutral pictures), but less engaged in the
subsequent self-control task (Stroop, contrast: incongruent vs.
congruent trials) relative to participants in the control group. Such
a finding would suggest that participants who had previously
exerted self-control were less able or less willing than participants
in the control group to recruit the respective brain area in the
Stroop task. Statistically, this hypothesis translates into an
interaction between the type of task (picture-viewing vs. Stroop,
within participants) and the experimental group (suppression vs.
control, between participants). As region of interest (ROI), we used
a functionally defined mask of prefrontal activation during the
Stroop task (containing the left and right lateral PFC as well as the
medial prefrontal cortex) obtained from the independent control
group (see methods section ‘‘ROI definition’’).
When examining the contrast incongruent versus congruent
trials in the Stroop task, we observed a trend for an interaction
between type of task and experimental group within the search
volume in the right lateral PFC ([50 22 28] (MNI coordinates),
Zmax = 3.53, k = 6, p= 0.065, corrected for multiple comparison
within the ROI). This trend was theoretically predicted, but failed
to reach conventional limits of significance. However, using
neutral trials (‘‘xxx’’) instead of congruent trials (i.e. employing the
contrast ‘incongruent-neutral’), a similar and highly significant
interaction was revealed in the exact same location in the right
lateral PFC ([50 22 28]; Zmax = 3.63, k = 22, p= .004, see Figure 3
and Table 1). The more pronounced interaction effect in the
analysis using neutral trials is possibly due to a more precise
estimation of the BOLD response for neutral trials (mean inter-
stimulus interval of the 30 neutral trials: 13.2 s) as compared to the
much more frequently occurring congruent trials (mean inter-
stimulus interval of the 120 congruent trials: 3.3 s). The peak
activation of the interaction is located in the right middle frontal
gyrus (BA 9, DLPFC), and the cluster extends to the right inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 9/BA 45, see Figure 3a–c). As illustrated in
Figure 3d, in the picture-viewing task, participants who were asked
to suppress their emotions activated the right lateral PFC more
strongly than the control group. By contrast, in the Stroop task, the
suppression group failed to reach the same level of activation in the
right lateral PFC as the control group did, overall resulting in
a significant interaction. In the overall interaction analysis, no
significant cluster was observed in the MFC or in the left lateral
PFC. Controlling for possible differences in emotional arousal by
adding arousal ratings as a covariate basically did not alter the
results (e.g., interaction in the right lateral PFC, [50 22 28],
Zmax = 3.65; k = 6, p = .065 for congruent trials; [50 22 28],
Zmax = 3.93; k = 14, p = .014 for neutral trials). The exploratory
whole brain analysis revealed no further significant clusters of
activation in the interaction analysis (all uncorrected ps ..001 and
k ,29).
Our hypothesis that a brain area is sensitive to aftereffects of
self-control relies on the assumption that there is an overlap
between prefrontal brain areas activated during emotion suppres-
sion and during the Stroop task. We tested this assumption by
inclusively masking the activation during the picture-viewing task
of the suppression group with the prefrontal ROIs representing
activation during the Stroop task in an independent sample. The
analysis indeed revealed that the suppression group showed
increased activation in the right lateral PFC ([47 8 28],
Zmax = 4.04; k = 37, p = .001) and the MFC ([28 14 60],
Zmax = 4.17; k = 44, p,.001), which overlapped with the prefrontal
activation in the Stroop task of the ROI-definition group
(Figure 2d). The right lateral PFC activation was located in the
inferior frontal gyrus (pars opercularis, BA 44, 57.6%; pars
triangularis, BA 45, 27.5%) and overlapped with the observed
interaction between task type and experimental group reported in
the previous section. The activation in the medial prefrontal cortex
was located in the bilateral supplementary motor area (BA 6) in
the conflict-and-error-detection zone [16]. In a similar analysis
involving activity during the picture-viewing task of the control
group not suppressing emotions instead of the suppression group,
no overlapping activation between the picture-viewing task and
the Stroop task was observed. Thus, in spite of overlapping
activation between emotion suppression and Stroop performance
in both the medial frontal cortex as well as the right lateral
prefrontal cortex, only the right lateral prefrontal cortex was
sensitive for aftereffects of prior self-control exertion as revealed by
the reported significant interaction between task type and
experimental group.
When analyzing the difference between experimental groups in
each task separately, the whole brain analysis of the picture-
viewing task revealed a significant cluster of activation in the
medial frontal gyrus/pre-SMA, which was more strongly activated
in the suppression group as compared to the control group (see
Table 2). Two further clusters in the right lateral PFC as well as
one in the left lateral PFC were more strongly activated in the
suppression as compared to the control group at a more lenient
threshold. All three of these clusters were located in the middle
frontal gyrus (BA 9: [36 41 32], Zmax = 4.07; k = 13, [44 19 40],
Zmax = 3.66; k = 6; and [241 47 16], Zmax = 3.58; k = 6; all ps
,.001, uncorrected). However, because these clusters did not pass
our predefined cluster threshold for the whole brain analysis, we
do not further consider these results. In the Stroop task, no
suprathreshold clusters were observed for the ‘‘congruent vs.
incongruent’’ contrast. For the ‘‘neutral (‘‘xxx’’) vs. incongruent’’
contrast, one cluster in the left occipital lobe and one cluster in the
precuneus were significantly less activated in the suppression group
than in the control group (see Table 2).
Correlational Analyses
On an exploratory basis, we calculated bivariate correlations
between Stroop performance and mean brain activity extracted
from the three ROIs during the Stroop task separately for each
experimental group (see Table 3). We did not have a priori
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hypotheses about the strength and direction of these correlations,
but we considered these data sufficiently interesting and potentially
useful for readers to present them here.
Correlations differed remarkably between experimental groups.
In the suppression group, more activity in the left and right lateral
PFC was significantly associated with better Stroop performance
(i.e. smaller Stroop interference effects; rrLPFC = -.59, p= .009;
Figure 3. Aftereffects of self-control exertion on brain activity in the right lateral prefrontal cortex. (a–c) More activity in participants
suppressing emotions during the picture-viewing task relative to control participants was followed by relatively less activity during the Stroop task in
a cluster located in the right middle frontal gyrus (BA 9), extending into the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 9/45). t-values of the interaction contrast are
color coded and displayed at a threshold of p= .005 (uncorrected) superimposed on a coronal (a), axial (b) and sagittal (c) slice of an anatomical
template image. (d) Parameter estimates (arbitrary units) of the averaged activity of the right lateral PFC cluster for the experimental groups.
Parameter estimates are extracted as first eigenvariate of all activated voxels in the cluster. Means 6 SE are indicated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.g003
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rlLPFC = -.51, p= .020). The direction of the relationship was the
same for the MFC ROI, but this correlation was not significant
(rMFC = -.29, p= .208). By contrast, in the control group greater
activity was associated with greater Stroop interference effects, and
this relationship was significant for the left lateral PFC ROI
(rlLPFC = .55, p= .016). The direction of the relationship was the
same for the right lateral PFC ROI and the MFC ROI, but these
correlations were not significant (rrLPFC = .28, p= .253; rMFC = .25,
p= .304). All correlations with p,.05 remained significant after
correction for multiple comparisons based on the Bonferroni-
Holm procedure [36]. The difference in correlations between the
suppression and the control group was significant for the right and
left lateral PFC ROIs (zrLPFC = 2.66, p= .008; zlLPFC = 3.39,
p,.001, all analyses two-tailed). Running these analyses based
on the contrast ‘‘neutral vs. incongruent trials’’ (for both Stroop
performance and parameter estimates) revealed a similar pattern
of correlations.
Discussion
Our data provides evidence for a role of the right lateral PFC in
the aftereffects of self-control on subsequent control attempts.
Participants who had recruited the right lateral PFC while
suppressing their emotions in the picture-viewing task committed
more errors and showed less activity in the same area during
a subsequent attempt at self-control in the Stroop task relative to
participants in a control condition who had recruited this area not
as strongly during the first task. In addition, two brain areas were
particularly strongly involved during both the emotion suppression
task (as indicated by the suppression group) and the Stroop task (as
indicated by an independent sample). One of these areas was in
the right lateral PFC including the cluster showing the above-
described pattern of strong recruitment in the emotion suppression
task and relatively reduced subsequent activation during the
Stroop task. The second overlapping area was located in the MFC,
Table 1. Results within the functionally defined prefrontal search volume for the interaction between activity during the picture-
viewing and the Stroop task for different types of analyses.
MNI (mm)
BA kE x y z Zmax p
Analysis I: incongruent vs. congruent trials
Picture-viewing: Suppression.control Stroop: Suppression,control
Middle/inferior frontal gyrus R 9/45 6 50 22 28 3.53 .065
Inverse contrast No suprathreshold clusters
Analysis II: incongruent vs. neutral trials
Picture-viewing: Suppression.control Stroop: Suppression,control
Inferior/middle frontal gyrus R 9/45 22 50 22 28 3.81 .004**
Inverse contrast No suprathreshold clusters
Note. BA: Brodmann area; R/L: right/left hemisphere; kE: number of voxels; Zmax: Z-value at the peak activation of the cluster. Analysis thresholded at p,.001
(uncorrected) inside the prefrontal ROI. Cluster-level corrected p-values are indicated (**: p,.01). The search volume was functionally defined in an independent sample
performing the Stroop task. It encompasses two activated clusters in the left and right lateral prefrontal cortices (including the inferior and middle frontal gyrus and the
lateral precentral gyrus) as well as one activated cluster in the medial frontal cortex (supplementary motor area and superior frontal gyrus).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.t001
Table 2. Results of the exploratory whole brain analysis for each task separately.
MNI (mm)
BA kE x y z Zmax p
Analysis IAPS task: negative vs. neutral pictures
Suppression.control
Medial frontal gyrus/pre-SMA 6/8 39 0 25 44 3.98 .013*
Inverse contrast No suprathreshold clusters
Analysis Stroop I: incongruent vs. congruent trials
Suppression.control No suprathreshold clusters
Inverse contrast No suprathreshold clusters
Analysis Stroop II: incongruent vs. neutral trials
Suppression.control No suprathreshold clusters
Inverse contrast
Occipital lobe 17 37 219 283 4 4.35 .016*
Precuneus 30 31 8 252 16 4.35 .034*
Note. BA: Brodmann area; R/L: right/left hemisphere; kE: number of voxels; Zmax: Z-value at the peak activation of the cluster. Analysis thresholded at p,.001
(uncorrected) in a minimum of kE .28 adjacent voxels. Cluster-level corrected p-values are indicated (*: p,.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.t002
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but did not show a similar pattern of aftereffects of self-control
exertion. Together, these results suggest that one way initial self-
control efforts may impact on subsequent attempts at self-control is
by impairing the later implementation of control through the right
lateral PFC.
A large number of studies implicate the lateral PFC, particularly
the DLPFC, in self-control activities such as inhibition, thought
and emotion suppression [13,14,17,21,26]. Evidence for a causal
role of the DLPFC in self-control is corroborated by studies
temporarily compromising the efficient functioning of this brain
area using low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (rTMS) [37]. In these studies, the application of rTMS on
the right DLPFC decreased the subsequent ability to control self-
interested impulses in the context of economic game paradigms
[38]. While low frequency rTMS produces a transient reduction in
cortical excitability for several minutes, in the present study the
activation of the right lateral PFC during self-control had
functionally equivalent effects by distorting the efficient function-
ing of this brain area in a subsequent attempt at self-control.
In contrast to the right lateral PFC, we found no reliable
evidence for a similar pattern of reduced activity in the MFC ROI
after emotion suppression even though part of this ROI was
strongly involved in the emotion suppression task and the Stroop
task (as indicated by an independent sample). This suggests that in
the present study the conflict-and-error-detection process was less
affected by the repeated exertion of self-control during emotion
suppression and the Stroop task than the right lateral PFC. This
result is consistent with the theoretical assumption that the
conflict-and-error-detection process is largely automatic and
resource-independent [19], but inconsistent with an EEG study
in which the error-related negativity as a marker for ACC activity
in the MFC was reduced in a Stroop task after the exertion of self-
control [23]. The present study considerably extends this latter
study in that it measured brain activity during both the first and the
subsequent self-control task, thereby allowing to test the more
specific hypothesis of neural aftereffects of self-control exertion as
a function of strong involvement of a brain area in both tasks. In
addition, using fMRI we were able to identify the reduced activity
in the right lateral PFC, an analysis less feasible with EEG as EEG
has a much lower spatial resolution as compared to fMRI.
It is worth discussing the pattern of the observed interaction
between the type of task (picture-viewing vs. Stroop) and
experimental group (suppression vs. control) in some detail (cf.
Figure 3). During the picture-viewing task, participants in the
suppression group were explicitly instructed to exert control and
suppress all emotions that would arise in response to the pictures
they saw. It is therefore plausible that these participants recruited
brain areas commonly involved in emotion suppression more
strongly (e.g., the right lateral PFC) [14,39,40] than participants
who saw the same pictures but were not instructed to suppress
their emotions. By contrast, for the Stroop task all participants
received identical instructions, and participants of both groups
activated the right lateral PFC during this task, which clearly
requires the control of dominant response tendencies. Neverthe-
less, participants in the suppression condition failed to recruit the
right lateral PFC to the same extent as participants in the control
condition.
It might be argued that a change in right lateral PFC activity
from the first to the second task is mainly seen in the control
participants, whereas the participants in the suppression group
remained on the same level in the first and second task (see
Figure 3). However, it is important to keep in mind that the right
lateral PFC activity in the control participants reflected the
‘normal’ situation: No right lateral PFC activity during passive
picture-viewing, strong right lateral PFC activity during the Stroop
task. When the right lateral PFC had been activated during
picture-viewing due to efforts to suppress emotions, then the
subsequent activity in the right lateral PFC was reduced relative to
the ‘normal’ level of activity observed in the control participants.
Thus, changes in right lateral PFC activity should always be
interpreted in relation to the control group.
In exploratory analyses, correlations between mean activities in
the lateral prefrontal ROIs during the Stroop task with Stroop
performance differed remarkably between experimental groups. In
the suppression group, increased activity in the left and right
lateral PFC ROIs during the Stroop task was associated with
better Stroop performance, as could be intuitively expected. In the
control group, this trend was reversed for the left lateral PFC ROI:
More activity in this ROI was associated with poorer Stroop
performance. This finding is puzzling for at least two reasons.
First, a large research literature suggests that more prefrontal
activity is associated with better performance in executive control
tasks including the Stroop task [7,26,41,42]. Second, the analyses
are based on mean activity in the complete ROIs of considerable
size (krLPFC = 279, klLPFC = 607, kMFC = 129 voxels). The results of
the correlational analyses are thought provoking, but should be
interpreted with caution until they have been replicated in
a different sample.
Although the right DLPFC has been prominently implicated in
self-control efforts, we do not claim that aftereffects of self-control
will consistently and exclusively affect this brain area in future
investigations using different experimental manipulations and
dependent variables. Due to the scarce empirical evidence to date,
it is too early to make strong predictions, but based on our initial
findings, we speculate that more generally those brain areas will be
affected by aftereffects of self-control that are strongly involved in
both self-control tasks. Recent evidence shows that beyond
a common core, many self-control tasks differ in various respects
[43], likely involving quite different brain areas. Thus, a combina-
tion of tasks that strongly engages, for example, the right DLPFC
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between Stroop interference effects and mean brain activity in the three regions of interest (ROI)
during the Stroop task.
Right lateral PFC ROI Left lateral FPC ROI MFC ROI
Stroop interference in suppression group 2.59* (p= .009) 2.51* (p= .020) 2.29 (p= .208)
Stroop interference in control group .28 (p= .253) .55* (p= .016) .25 (p= .304)
Note. *: significant after Bonferroni-Holm correction for multiple comparisons [36]. Stroop interference effects are calculated as errors on incongruent trials minus errors
on congruent trials, residualized by average response latency. Brain activity during the Stroop task is calculated as the difference between incongruent vs. congruent
trials. We extracted the parameter estimates for each subject for the left and right lateral PFC as well as the medial prefrontal ROI as first eigenvariate of all voxels in the
respective ROI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0060385.t003
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in one task, but not in the other, may not reveal the same pattern
as in the current study. Other brain areas that have been
implicated in various self-control tasks and are thus likely
candidates for aftereffects of self-control exertion include, among
others, the left DLPFC [44] and the right ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex [45]. Thus, similar effects on the behavioral level (a first task
impairing performance on the second) may be associated with
different effects on the neural level (reduced activation of varying
brain areas implicated in self-control across studies). The present
study revealed that despite being strongly involved in both self-
control tasks, an area in the MFC did not show aftereffects of prior
self-control exertion. An intriguing challenge for future research
will be to test the robustness of this finding and – if robust – to
reveal the processes that explain why one brain area is sensitive to
this kind of aftereffects of self-control exertion and another brain
area is not. Taken one step further, it is even possible that the same
brain area is sensitive to aftereffects under some, but not under
other circumstances, depending on how psychologically effortful
the respective behavioral tasks are and how much they impact on
the motivation to control one’s responses.
Beyond the mere demonstration of areas affected by aftereffects
of self-control exertion, it will be particularly challenging for future
research to clearly identify the processes that are in turn affected
by these aftereffects, such as the impaired recruitment of control to
solve response conflicts. In addition, recent research suggests that
lateral prefrontal areas are actively engaged in down-regulating
activity in subcortical brain areas associated with impulses and
craving (e.g., the ventral striatum) [46]. Thus, one crucial
consequence of aftereffects of self-control may not only be the
weakening of prefrontal control per se, but also the in turn
enhanced activity in reward-related subcortical areas in response
to a temptation, as strong activity in these areas increases the
likelihood of self-control failures [7,47].
Much of the behavioral research on the aftereffects of self-
control exertion built on the assumption of a limited physiological
resource that is reduced through the exertion of self-control and is
later lacking for a subsequent successful self-control performance.
The nature of this resource remains elusive. Some evidence
suggested that the availability of glucose was one important factor
[48,49], but this assumption has been severely challenged [50–54].
Beyond a physiological understanding of the resource, mounting
evidence underlines the important role of psychological processes
such as the belief that the ability to exert control is limited, or the
motivation to control [55–57]. For example, initial self-control
efforts decrease the motivation to further exert control [58], but
given appropriate incentives, individuals are well capable of
counteracting deleterious aftereffects of self-control [59]. An
intriguing question is how these psychological processes translate
into changes in brain activity. Providing a possible explanation for
the results of the present study, a reduced motivation to control
may lead to less effort in subsequent self-control tasks, resulting in
a decreased activation of task-relevant brain areas. Increased
motivation to overcome these deficits could compensate reductions
in brain activity or even recruit additional brain areas to achieve
satisfactory levels of performance. These issues illustrate the great
array of open questions with regard to the neural processes
involved in self-control and its failures. Understanding these
processes is an effort that has only just begun.
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